


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(a) It is clear that if  $x_2 > 0$  then  $x_1 = 0$ : if both  $x_1$  and  $x_2$  are positive, every unit shifted from Plant 1 to Plant 2 saves \$2. Thus, ~~any~~ all production will be carried out in just one of the plants.

It is also clear that all is in Plant 1 when output is small, all in Plant 2 when output is large. To determine the output  $\hat{x}$  at which the switch occurs, solve  $C_1(x) = C_2(x)$ :  $4x = k + 2x$ ; i.e.,  $x = \frac{1}{2}k$ .



Now we have the firm's cost function:


$$C(Q) = \begin{cases} 4Q & \text{if } Q \leq \frac{1}{2}k \\ k + 2Q & \text{if } Q \geq \frac{1}{2}k \end{cases} \quad MC = \begin{cases} 4 & \text{if } Q < \frac{1}{2}k \\ 2 & \text{if } Q > \frac{1}{2}k \end{cases}$$

The firm's revenue:  $12Q - Q^2$ . Thus,  $MR = 12 - 2Q$ .

Setting  $MR = MC$ :

If  $Q < \frac{1}{2}k$ :  $MC = 4$ ,  $\therefore Q = 4$ ,  $p = 8$ ,  
 $\pi = 32 - 16 = 16$ .

If  $Q > \frac{1}{2}k$ :  $MC = 2$ ,  $\therefore Q = 5$ ,  $p = 7$ ,  
 $\pi = 35 - k - 10 = 25 - k$ .



Since  $25 - k > 16 \Leftrightarrow k < 9$ , we have:

If  $k < 9$ , then  $p = 7$ ,  $Q = 5$  (all produced in Plant 2);

If  $k > 9$ , then  $p = 8$ ,  $Q = 4$  (all produced in Plant 1).

If  $k = 9$ , then  $[p = 7, Q = 5 \frac{1}{2}: \text{Plant 2}]$  and  $[p = 8, Q = 4: \text{Plant 1}]$  are equally good.

$$(b) \quad \pi_1(x_1, x_2) = (12 - x_1 - x_2)x_1 - 4x_1 = 8x_1 - x_2x_1 - x_1^2$$

$$\frac{\partial \pi_1}{\partial x_1} = (8 - x_2) - 2x_1 = 0 \Leftrightarrow x_1 = 4 - \frac{1}{2}x_2 = r_1(x_2).$$

$$\pi_2(x_1, x_2) = (12 - x_1 - x_2)x_2 - 2x_2 - K = 10x_2 - x_1x_2 - x_2^2 - K$$

$$\frac{\partial \pi_2}{\partial x_2} = (10 - x_1) - 2x_2 = 0 \Leftrightarrow x_2 = 5 - \frac{1}{2}x_1$$

... BUT MUST ALSO HAVE  $\pi_2 \geq 0$ :

$$(10 - x_1 - x_2)x_2 > K; \quad \text{IF } x_2 > 0, \text{ THEN}$$


$$x_2 = 5 - \frac{1}{2}x_1; \quad \text{i.e., } 10 - x_1 - x_2 = x_2; \quad \therefore x_2^2 \geq K;$$

i.e.,  $x_2 \geq \sqrt{K}$ .

Firm 2's reaction function is thus

$$x_2 = r_2(x_1) = \begin{cases} 5 - \frac{1}{2}x_1, & \text{IF } 5 - \frac{1}{2}x_1 > \sqrt{K}; \\ 0, & \text{OTHERWISE.} \end{cases}$$

IF  $K = 16$ :




TWO NASH EQUILIBRIA:

(1)  $x_1 = 4, x_2 = 0, Q = 4,$   
 $p = 8, \pi_2 = 0,$   
 $\pi_1 = 32 - 16 = 16$

(2)  $x_1 = 2, x_2 = 4, Q = 6,$   
 $p = 6, \pi_2 = 24 - 8 - 16 = 0,$   
 $\pi_1 = 12 - 8 = 4.$

IF  $K > 16$ :



THE ONLY NASH EQUILIBRIUM

IS (1)  $\frac{1}{2}$ :  $x_1 = 4$  AND  $x_2 = 0$ .

THE OUTCOME (2) IS NO  
 LONGER AN EQUILIBRIUM  
 WITH  $K > 16$ .

(c) It is clear that a competitive equilibrium price could not be greater than  $p = 2$  (Firm 2 could increase its profit without bound by increasing its output — but this would be an excess supply), nor could it be smaller than  $p = 2$  (neither firm would produce — an excess demand). What about  $p = 2$ ? Again, neither firm will produce: Firm 1 fails to cover its variable ~~variable~~ cost, and Firm 2 fails to cover its fixed cost. Strictly speaking, then, there is no competitive equilibrium.